Parliament’s role is legislative oversight and representation — Kondowe
By Joseph Kayira
As civil society organizations, Law Society and Malawi Local Government Association (MALGA) continue to raise concerns on members of Parliament’s wish to manage and control the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), The Lamp magazine engages National Advocacy Platform (NAP) chairperson Benedicto Kondowe, who says the Constituency Development Fund Amendment Bill, which Parliament passed recently, violates the doctrine of separation of powers. He says this separation safeguards accountability, prevents conflicts of interest, and protects the integrity of public resources. The excerpts
What is the genesis of this war of words between CSOs and MPs on CDF? What is the background?
The disagreement is rooted in a constitutional dispute, not politics. In Registered Trustees of the Malawi Local Government Association v Attorney General (Constitutional Case No. 3 of 2023), the High Court unequivocally held that Members of Parliament cannot manage, prioritise, or implement constituency development funds, as doing so violates the doctrine of separation of powers and creates an inherent conflict of interest. Parliament’s role is legislative oversight and representation — not execution of public funds.
Despite this binding determination, some MPs are now pushing legislation that would restore their control over CDF governance. Civil society’s objection is therefore grounded in constitutionalism, judicial compliance, and good governance, not hostility toward Parliament.
Why the Constituency Development Fund Bill this time around?
The timing is not accidental. It is closely linked to both the proposed increase of CDF to K5 billion per constituency and the political fallout from Constitutional Case No. 3 of 2023. For years, some MPs have relied on CDF as a political tool to influence electoral outcomes, using project control to build patronage and visibility. The Court’s decision, which unequivocally directed that MPs be removed from the management of CDF, was therefore deeply unsettling to those who viewed the fund as central to their re-election strategies.
Following the delivery of that judgment, CDF operations were suspended two to three months before the general elections, precisely because the existing governance framework had been declared unconstitutional. Instead of accepting and operationalizing the Court’s directives, the current Bill appears designed to reclaim political control over CDF through legislation, effectively undoing the Court’s ruling. This raises serious concerns about motive, respect for judicial authority, and whether the Bill is driven by public interest or electoral expediency.
What do we know about CDF and who should manage it according to law?
CDF is public money intended to finance local development priorities. Under Section 146 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Local Government Act, responsibility for local development planning, implementation, and management is vested in local government authorities, not in individual political office holders. Accordingly, any constituency-based development fund must be administered through councils and technical structures, subject to the Public Finance Management Act and other accountability laws.
Members of Parliament have an important and legitimate role in representing community needs and exercising parliamentary oversight, but not in approving, implementing, or managing development projects. This approach is consistent with regional best practice.
Kondowe: Parliament’s role is not execution of public funds (Photo Credit: BK)
In jurisdictions such as Kenya and Zambia, where CDF is governed by standalone legislation, MPs do not manage the fund; administration is entrusted to professional bodies and local authorities, with MPs playing advisory or oversight roles only. This separation safeguards accountability, prevents conflicts of interest, and protects the integrity of public resources.
Why should it matter that MPs want to manage CDF? Why the concern of hijacking?
It matters because it collapses accountability and violates constitutional design. When MPs manage CDF, they become decision-makers, implementers, and overseers of the same fund, erasing essential checks and balances. This arrangement also forces MPs to encroach into executive functions reserved for central government and local councils, directly offending the doctrine of separation of powers. The result is a system ripe for patronage, selective allocation, procurement manipulation, and politicization of development. The concern is not hypothetical: experience shows that control over development funds quickly translates into control over political loyalty, contracts, and electoral advantage.
Are MPs acting against the Constitution and Constitutional Court ruling?
Yes. Any attempt to reassign the governance or management of CDF to Members of Parliament directly contradicts the binding determination in Constitutional Case No. 3 of 2023, which held that MPs’ involvement in managing and implementing development funds violates the Constitution. In a constitutional democracy, court decisions are final and binding on all organs of the State. They cannot be circumvented or neutralized through legislative manoeuvres aimed at restoring roles that the Court has already declared unconstitutional.
CSOs threatened demonstrations — how do you intend to proceed?
With the Bill now passed and awaiting Presidential assent, our immediate focus is to petition the President to exercise his constitutional authority to withhold assent and refer the Bill back to Parliament where he deems it contrary to the best interests of Malawians. Presidential assent is a constitutional safeguard, not a formality. The Bill raises serious concerns regarding compliance with Constitutional Case No. 3 of 2023, the doctrine of separation of powers, and Malawi’s decentralization framework. The President has both the power and responsibility to prevent unconstitutional legislation from taking effect.
Should assent nevertheless be granted, civil society is prepared to seek judicial determination on the constitutionality of the amendment, so that the courts can pronounce on whether Parliament acted within constitutional bounds. At the same time, we are mobilizing citizens to hold their Members of Parliament accountable for advancing legislation that contradicts overwhelming public opinion. Afrobarometer evidence and sustained opposition on live radio and television programmes show that Malawians do not support MP management of CDF. Civil society will therefore continue lawful civic action—through petitions, public engagement, media platforms, and, where necessary, peaceful demonstrations—to defend constitutional order and protect public resources.
How is this Bill a threat to decentralization and separation of powers?
The Bill directly undermines decentralization by shifting local development functions away from councils, contrary to Section 146 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Local Government Act, which vest development planning and implementation in local government authorities. By assigning executive control of CDF to MPs, the Bill recentralizes power, sidelines councils, and simultaneously violates the doctrine of separation of powers by transforming MPs from overseers into administrators—eroding constitutional safeguards against abuse.
Do you see the Bill being suspended should the President withdraw his assent? If not, how will you respond?
Yes. If the President withholds assent and refers the Bill back to Parliament, its coming into force will be suspended, allowing constitutional and governance concerns to be properly addressed. Should this not happen and the Bill be assented to, civil society will respond through sustained public advocacy, citizen mobilization, and constitutional litigation to seek judicial review of the amendment. Our objective is not confrontation, but the defence of constitutional order, decentralization, and the rule of law.
Were there sufficient consultation, or did MPs take a shortcut?
There were no genuine consultations. Anticipating strong public and stakeholder opposition, MPs deliberately advanced the proposal as a Private Member’s Bill to bypass the Government Bill process, which ordinarily ensures Cabinet scrutiny, policy coherence, and broad public consultation. The limited engagements conducted by the Legal Affairs Committee were cosmetic and perfunctory, undertaken after the outcome had already been decided. This was a calculated manoeuvre to evade public accountability and fast-track a self-serving agenda, undermining participatory democracy and confirming that Parliament acted against the clearly expressed will of Malawians.
Councillors are critical in local development projects (Photo Credit: Internet)
Is the interest about K5 billion or serving people? What about accountability?
The scale of K5 billion per constituency dramatically increases the risk of abuse. If the objectives were genuinely to serve people, the response would be to strengthen controls, not to place the Fund under political control. True accountability requires transparent procurement, independent audits, public disclosure of projects and expenditures, clear sanctions for abuse, and active community oversight. Entrusting CDF management to MPs weakens these safeguards and exposes public resources to patronage and misuse rather than protecting them in the public interest.
Your final words.
We support the President’s goodwill to strengthen local development through CDF and stand ready to ensure that this goodwill is not sabotaged by political self-interest. The President’s intention is to devolve development to councils for the benefit of all Malawians. Parliament must therefore remain a law-making and oversight institution, not an implementing authority. Malawi needs a CDF that is professionally managed, council-led, transparent, and citizen-centred, so that public resources advance genuine community development and the national interest—not political advantage.
